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ONWARD CONSTITUTIONAL SOLDIERS
Milner S. Ball*
FAITH. By Sanford Levinson.**
Princeton University Press. · 1988. Pp. xii, 250. $19.95.

CONSTITUTIONAL

Princeton:

We are unlikely to be given a more careful, thoughtful, and candid
insider's account of the American "civil religion'~ 1 than Sanford Levinson's Constitutional Faith, the fruit of a decade's reflection by a leading legal scholar. 2 Much good can come of the constitutional religion.
It may bind together diverse groups into one polity, for example, or
may expand the polity's embrace of the dissentient, the disestablished,
and the poor, as its heroes Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King,
Jr. taught us. American civil religion has also a seldom-considered
downside, however, revealed through its anti-heroes like Richard
Nixon and Oliver North, that can issue in exclusion and division and
uncritical obedience to the powers that be. Not the least strength of
Levinson's study is its fr~nk examination of the disintegrating, fragmenting potential that constitutional religion shares with all the
"many fighting faiths." 3 Religious ambiguity, tension, and division
• Caldwell Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia School of Law. A.B.
1958, Princeton University; S.T.B. 1961, Harvard University; J.D. 1971, University of Georgia
School of Law. - Ed.
•• Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. -Ed.
1. Rousseau invented the phrase "civil religion" to describe the religion he believed necessary
to a republic, concluding that Christianity would not serve this purpose. J. ROUSSEAU, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT 176-87 (M. Cranston trans. 1968). Debate about the existence and content of
an American civil religion was precipitated by Bellah. See Civil Religion in America, in R. BELLAH, BEYOND BELIEF: EssAYS ON RELIGION JN A Posr-TRADmONAL WORLD 168 (1970)
(written for a 1966 conference). The American civil religion is said to be a set of religious symbols and practices supporting political legitimacy and not fused with either church or state - a
kind of worship of the republic or of a higher reality upholding the republic. It is prototypically
expressed in presidential inaugural addresses with their predictable invocations of a nonpartisan,
amorphous God. The courts, it has been proposed, are this religion's "new pulpits." Hammond,
Pluralism and Law in the Formation of American Civil Religion, in VARIETIES OF CIVIL RELIGION 138, 161 (1980).
Levinson describes his book as part of the "interest in civil religion" (p. 62), and relates how
he signed onto a "limited constitutional faith" (p. 193). These self-descriptions coupled with the
tenor of the book are my grounds for referring to it as an insider's account. Full disclosure
compels that I note my unsympathetic regard for American civil religion. My misgivings about
both American civil religion in particular and state Christianity in general are stated, among
other places, in Ball, Cross and Sword, Victim and Law: A Tentative Response to Leonard Levy~
Treason Against God (Book Review), 35 STAN. L. REv. 1007, 1007-09, 1028-31 (1983); Ball,
Obligation: Not to the Law But to the Neighbor, 18 GA. L. REv. 911, 919-27 (1984). Readers of
this revi(!W may wish to take my preconceptions into account when considering both my positive
assessment of Levinson's work and my criticism of it.
2. See Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123.
3. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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compose the organizing principle of the book.
The frontispiece is a telling cartoon. It depicts a stylized columnar
swirl of robing from the top of which emerges the stovepipe-hatted
head of Lincoln and his right hand with the index finger pointing skyward toward the light. At the base, the enfolded head of Nixon scowls
down at the darkness. The ~awing may be taken to suggest a weathervane rotating vertically. With the political winds upwelling and
blowing divinely, the American civil religion does· lift, inspire, enlighten - Lincoln ascendant. But as we and Levinson know only too
well, winds shiftr
Accordingly, when, in the last chapter, Levinson tells of adding his
signature to the Constitution in a Philadelphia bicentennial exhibit personal testimony to acc~ptance of membership in the company of
believers - he spc:;aks circumspectly, of "a limited constitutim)al faith"
that commits him only to "a process of becoming and . . . to taking
political conversation seriously" (p. 193). This is hardly the irrational,
unseeing en'.thusias_m of the freshly born-again and for that reason,
among ot:l~ers, ltj.s views will ~ely be found to bear weight. Even so, it
is a religious commitment and for that rea~on should give pause to
readers, especially those Levinson refers to as "more 'God-oriented' "
than he. 4

I.

LEVINSON'S DIALECTICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH

Levinson draws categories from the theory and history of other
religions to aid his explication of the American faith centered on the
Constitution.
A.

Protestants and Catholics

He begins by applying to constitutional faith's divisions over text
and interpretation a typology informed by Protestant-Catholic disputes about doctrinal authority (pp. 18-53). Protestants, in his
scheme, take sacred teJ!:t as the source of authority. They are doubly
protestant (his category of protestant-protestant) when they repose interpretive authority in the individual, each believer reading and interpreting the Bible for herself. Catholics believe that it is not scripture
4. I am not at all sure, but I think Levllison would consign me to the "more 'God-oriented'
readers, with whom many of us do not identify ...." P. 56. My uncertainty arises from his
description of such readers as "those who identify 'religious beliefs' as the knowable words (or
commands) of a divine presence rather than either idiosyncratic metaphors concerning an ineffable mystery or, more likely, psychological or sociological projections of all-too-human anxieties
or social structures." P. 56. I cannot locate myself within his unnecessarily limitea (and pejorative?) range of alternatives. He seems to be unfamiliar with contemporary reflection upon and
response to biblical critique of human religiousness. As Harvey Cox has noted, "religion is not
always and everywhere a good thing," and those of us who attempt to understand the biblical
sagas are hard-pressed to do so in a time "when the rebirth of religion, rather than its disappearance, poses the most serious question." H. Cox, RELIGION IN THE SECULAR CITY: TowARD A
POSTMODERN THEOLOGY 19-20 (1984). See also infra notes 21-23 and supra note 1.
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alone but unwritten tradition and scripture that serve as the joint
source of authority. They are catholic-catholic when the hierarchical,
institutionalized Church rather than the individual has the decisive
authority to interpret.
Differentiating practitioners of constitutional faith according to
this typology - instead of casting them as originalists/non-originalists
or interpretivists/non-interpretivists - produces interesting results.
Frederick Douglass and Ed Meese, who contrast in almost every other
imaginable way, may be understood to share a protestant-protestant
commitment to the validity of individual interpretation of the sacred
text of the Constitution standing alone. Pitted against the protestantprotestants are the catholic-catholics, like John Marshall Harlan, who
take unwritten tradition together with the Constitution for their
source and the Supreme Court for their authorized interpreter. In the
fray in-between are protestant-catholics (Hugo Black and other believers in text and judicial supremacy in interpretation) and catholic-protestants (Ronald Dworkin and those who believe in more than text and
less than exclusive judicial supremacy) (pp. 51-52).
The point of the exercise is not a new academic game of pin-thetag-on-the-believer but a demonstration of both the relevance of religious categories and the religious-like nature of the divisiveness in constitutional theory as constitutional theology.
B.

Constitution and Morality

Other religions confront the problem of theodicy, the problem of
explaining evil in a world in which God is omnipotent and just. Does
submission to God entail abandonment of human standards of good
and evil? Is whatever God does good? Levinson identifies as a weaker
version of this dilemma American civil religion's concern for relating
the Constitution and morality: Can the order created out of citizens'
submission to the Constitution claim to be just as well as powerful? Is
whatever is constitutional good?
Some constitutional commentators deemphasize or do not discern
a difference between law and morality. 5 One consequence of assuming
a happy correlation of the American legal system with goodness and
justice is to assure attorneys that they may take untroubled moral
pride in the full range of their professional activities - the good lawyer is the good person. 6
Levinson credits the need to sanctify constitutional law in a diverse
contemporary society that lacks a shared moral vision, for the Constitution may be, after all, the only binding principle of order that re5. Levinson discusses Owen Fiss as an example of a commentator who deemphasizes the
difference. Pp. 58-59.
6. Charles Fried is discussed as an advocate of such a point of view. P. 167.
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mains. Nevertheless - playing out his fundamental theme of religious
ambiguity and disintegration - Levinson also cautions that constitutional faith is "idolatrous if it leads its adherents to suspend their independent evaluation of the tenets of the faith" (p. 88). He describes
without resolving the dilemma of a more-or-less necessary constitutional fealty that inevitably becomes a self-destructive idolatry.
C. Loyal Sheep and Questionable Goats
Religious communities employ creedal affirmations to determine
who is a member and who is not, who is orthodox and who unorthodox. This method of separating insiders from outsiders is characteristic as well of the American civil religious community. The American
creed7 is an instrument of inclusion when endorsement of it allows
immigrants to be accepted as citizens, and it is an instrument of exclusion when it serves as a benchmark for dividing true Americans from
un-Americans, real from false patriots (pp. 94-99).
In performing this basic sorting function, American creedalism,
according to Levinson, creates a constellation of problems or tensions.
One not fully addressed by the traditional learning is that of the conflict or hierarchy of attachments (pp. 122-54). Loyalty oaths of the
typ€? required of many officeholders and public employees raise the
question of exclusivity of attachment: supreme loyalty is sworn to the
Constitution (or country), but American citizens have multiple loyalties to other political entities, to other institutions, to other religious
communities, any of which may legitimately claim supremacy. What
does it mean, then, to require a pledge of allegiance to the United
States? Is this to insist on primary loyalty to Constitution, nation, or
flag over loyalty to family and religion? The dilemma is typically
glossed over rather than confronted or resolved or acknowledged.
A second ambiguity of attachment raised by subscription to the
American creed is one of content. If we profess supreme loyalty to the
Constitution, what Constitution are we agreeing to become attached to
and by which tokens of allegiance? Levinson draws again upon forms
of religious thought to illuminate the question.
In the Jewish and Christian traditions, a distinction is sometimes
made between revelatory events and the texts that bear witness to
them, between the acts of God and the biblical stories about them. A
similar distinction can be drawn in the American civil religion between the sacred events and the sacred texts. Which then is the object
of reverence - the revolutionary, law-breaking acts of the beginning
or the culminating Philadelphia text? Do we venerate the idol-smash7. The notion of an "American creed" is attributed to Samuel Huntington and is described as
"a set of overt political commitments that includes an emphasis on individual rights, majority
rule, and a constitutional order limiting governmental power." P. 95.
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ing or idolize the Constitution? And what form does our devotion
take - inner adoration or outward compliance, faith or good works?
Levinson explores two examples of the ambiguities of constitutional attachment. The first is Schneiderman v. United States, 8 in
which the Supreme Court was confronted with the problem of identifying the Constitution it was to interpret. When he had become a naturalized citizen, Schneiderman claimed both that he behaved as one
attached to the Constitution and that he was a Communist party
member. Some years later the United States sought to set aside his
citizenship as illegally procured. Was internal, mental disposition or
external, observed behavior to be the accepted manifestation of attachment to the Constitution? A devoted Communist may be an outwardly law-abiding citizen for a variety of reasons, including
prudential calculation about what is possible in the meantime before
the government can be successfully overthrown. Correspondingly,
persons firmly attached to the principles of the American creed may
act illegally, out of the most American of motives and after the fashion
of the founders. Which is the truer: doing what the founders did or
what they wrote? Then, too, is a Communist program of the dictatorship of the proletariat totally incongruent with constitutional commitment to a federal republic governed by the people?
In Schneiderman the Court punted. It did not approve Schneiderman's position but set a high standard of proof for removal of citizenship and held that the government had failed to meet it in its attempt
to show absence of constitutional attachment. 9
The other example of the problems of constitutional attachment is
Abraham Lincoln's combination of reverence for law and indifference
to legal niceties (suspension of habeas corpus, military arrest). To
Levinson, Lincoln is the incarnation of the tension between nationally
responsible and constitutionally faithful action. It may be easier, he
observes, "to reinterpret the Constitution to be congruent with Lincoln's actions" than to interpret the actions into congruence with the
Constitution, but "such reinterpretation ... raise[s] the possibility that
we may have 'many Constitutions,' " requiring that we "decide which
Constitution garnered Lincoln's attachment and which, in turn, deserves our own." 10
D. I Believe, Help My Unbelief
The book concludes with two chapters of honest, more directly
personal assessment of belief and practice in the American civil religion. Levinson addresses the question of what it means to be a profes8. 320 U.S. 118 (1943). The discussion begins at p. 126.
9. 320 U.S. at 154. See p. 126.
10. P. 141. Levinson says he borrowed the "many Constitutions" passage from Che
Guevara. Id.
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sor of constitutional law in the legal academy - what it means, in his
terms, to profess the constitutional faith to its future professional practitioners (pp. 155-79).
The issue has been given some currency by in-house tempests
about whether members of the Critical Legal Studies movement
should be allowed on law school faculties. Levinson frames the issue
in religious terms of the sort employed throughout the book: whether
law schools are either divinity schools or schools of religion, whether
Crits are atheists and blasphemers, and whether, if they are blasphemers, they should be admitted to law faculties.
After a balanced consideration of the conflicting possibilities, Levinson confesses to personal beliefs that are liberal (as opposed to illiberal, not as opposed to conservative, i.e., not in the sense of George
Bush's demagogic talk about the "L word"). The law school is to him
less divinity school than "department of religion" where law "always
remains worthy of our study" althqugh it may be "unworthy of our
faith" (p. 179). Levinson would admit the Crits. At least he says he
would admit the Schneidermans of the world were they to apply for
faculty positions. However, the issue of tests of faith for teachers of
the young·- identifying Schneidermans and Crits, doubters and heretics, and determining their status - cannot be resolved by "cold logic
and analysis" (p. 179). It requires that we "choose between two fundamentally different cultural visions of legal study. A leap must be
made, whether of faith or of something else" (p. 179).
Levinson ends with the confession of his own choice by telling the
story of his Philadelphia experience and the struggle in his heart when
he found himself in the Second Bank of the United States before the
National Park Service bicentennial exhibit, "Miracle in Philadelphia,"
confronted, with every other tourist-become-pilgrim, by two endless
scrolls and the question of whether to add his name to the foot of the
Constitution (pp.· 180-94). He relates how his hand was finally compelled to move by "the memory of Frederick Douglass and his willingness to embrace the Constitution" (p. 192). Levinson testifies that jn
giving his signature he yielded the "sign of our willingness to join in
affirming a 'constitutional faith,' whatever the attendant difficulties in
giving content to the notion" (p. 181) and whatever the accompanying
qualifications and reservations.

IJ.

RELIGION OR JUST RHETORIC AND AMAZING GRACE?

This is a fine volume. It deserves and will command a good audience. No summ~ry can capture the subtleties in which its successes
reside. Levinson is deeply, winsomely committed to dialogue and invites readers to engage in it, with him (p. 8). I shall be understood to
accept his invitation and to authenticate my positive, tributary assessment of his book if I raise a question about his enterprise.
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The American civil religion is shot through with ambiguities, and
Levinson succeeds in describing them. He also succeeds in honestly
revealing his own ambivalence as an adherent of the faith, one who is a
thinking, tolerant practitioner with a firm grasp of the limits of the
belief, one who cautions against the idolatry of unqualified constitutional faith.
In addition to the intentionally addressed ambiguities of the object
studied and the studying subject there is a further and nondeliberate
ambiguity running through Levinson's book. His talk of an American
civil religion, which has the Constitution for its central sacred text, is
variously and irreconcilably metaphorical, analogical, and factual talk.
The title Constitutional Faith seems to be a metaphor, and Levinson
frequently employs it or specifically identifies it as such. 11 With equal
frequency, however, he treats or specifically characterizes the relation
between law and religion as one of analogy, 12 and he draws on the
concepts and history of religion to compare them - analogize them
- to secular American constitutional law. At other times "constitutional faith," "American civil religion," and "American faith community" appear as statements of fact and not as statements of analogy or
metaphor. 13
An analogy starts from the premise of difference between two
things compared and suggests possible likenesses across the gulf of
their difference; it is the statement of an equivocal relation. A metaphor, on the other hand, starts from the premise that the thing said
and the thing meant share at some fundamental level an identity that
happens in the metaphor; it realizes a univocal relation. Finally, a
statement of fact is a statement of identity and not of relation.
Constitutional faith has one set of implications and claims if it is an
analogy, another if it is a metaphor. The implications and claims grow
in complexity and become wholly unacceptable if constitutional faith
is a statement of fact.
Levinson says he would not be surprised "if many readers felt intense disquiet at the implication of the analogy between law and religion that is the foundation of this book" (p. 121). I do not think any
reader will be disquieted by the implications of the analogy. Analogies
are the common currency of teachers. If they work and provide instruction - this one does both - then the execution gives pleasure.
Of course the content of the instruction provided can be troubling
(e.g., American treatment of Native Americans is like genocide). But
where does trouble arise from saying that American politics is like
religion, that respecting and interpreting the Constitution is like re11. E.g., pp. 15-16, 158-59, 194.
12. E.g., pp. 16-17, 27, 36, 59, 121.
13. E.g., pp. 51-52, 93-94, 96, 180, 193.

May 1989)

Onward Constitutional Soldiers

1445

specting and interpreting a sacred text, that social disintegration is like
sectarian disintegration?
On the other hand, one might feel some disquiet about the implications if constitutional faith is a metaphor. Readers might experience
enough of a shock of recognition to rethink the relative importance of
rendering dues to Caesar and to God. Generally, however, a metaphor's power - of whatever kind, whether to unsettle or inspire or
startle or delight - depends upon the distance between the thing said
and the thing meant: the further apart, the greater the power (the
swimming fish is a grey, monotonous soul; the encampment of the
poor on the D.C. Mall is Resurrection City). My own sense is that
belief in American constitutional government and religious belief (love
of country and love of God) are generally regarded as so close together
("for God, for country, and for Yale") that many readers will not feel
intense disquiet at constitutional faith as metaphor and its
implications. 14
.
But constitutional faith as a statement of fact should cause alarm.
The Constitution was the invention of men of the eighteenth century.
"There is no ultimate mystery in what the Constitution is about, at
least for those who accept [the] premise that [the world] is in principle
subject to human understanding. It is this secularist premise that
makes constitutional interpretation, for all its complexities, something
fundamentally different from the interpretation of a scripture ...." 15
The Constitution is an artifact. To worship it is idolatry plain and
simple.
Levinson cites the contention of Justice Brennan, a Roman Catholic, that he had settled in his mind to undertake "an obligation under
the Constitution which could not be influenced by any of my religious
principles. . . . [T]o the extent [Roman Catholic belief] conflicts with
what I think the Constitution means or requires, then my religious
beliefs have to give way" (p. 56). Certainly this statement of subordination of Christian to constitutional faith must be taken seriously.
Without more it is troubling, even shocking. Does it have any more
than face value as a ·confessed privileging of constitutional faith, as
idolatry?
·
The author notes that, especially for Roman Catholic candidates
for the Supreme Court, the confirmation process has been a degrading
ceremony (owing presumably to majoritarian suspicion or prejudice)
(p. 56). Is it in this light that Brennan's .1956, pre-President Kennedy
belief is to be understood? Does it belong to a type of concession
wrung by an orthodox majority -from a minority of believers?
14. I itch whenever Levinson shifts from analogy to metaphor and/or fact but am uncertain
how many others will share my ,need to scratch.
15. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1984) (footnote
omitted).
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May the statement be seen in the interpretive context of Brennan's
life as a judge, the history of his work on the Court? Is there to be
discerned in his record the work of a Christian infidel? His is not the
story of a judge who set aside one faith to serve the oppressive, nationalist institutions of another. For this reason, it is misleading for Levinson to strip the statement of its post-Holocaust, post-Brown, BrennanCourt context and to describe it as an echo of Justice Story's apologia
for an opinion supporting slavery: "I shall never hesitate to do my
duty as a Judge,.under the Constitution and laws of the United States,
be the consequences what they may" (p. 56). Brennan was not puffing
judicial duty as an excuse for ducking out on the oppressed.
There is a related inattention to context in Levinson's use of the
statement - pivotal to him - made oy Representative Barbara Jordan in the Watergate/impeachment hearings: "My faith in the Constitution is whole. It is complete. It is total" (p. 15). This is political
rhetoric, not religious confession. Jordan certainly intended to highlight the special relationship between herself as a black woman and the
Constitution withirt whose protection she had "finally been
included." 16
Jordan drew attention to the rhetorical character of her comments
both directly ("I believe hyperbole would not be fictional ... 1' 17) and
indirectly. L.H. LaRue correctly notes that her rhetorical technique
"came down to the contrast between the nobility of her language (both
her own and that which she quoted) and the actuality of Nixon's conduct."18 To her own constitutional faithfulness and that of others, she
juxtaposed Nixon's failure in the constitutionally charged "task of taking care that the laws befaithfully executed." 19 Nixon committed an
impeachable offense, not apostasy or heresy. And Jordan was employing the exceptional political rhetoric demanded by so extreme an
occasion.
Much the same thing needs to be said about Douglass, whose example has also exerted great influence on Levinson. Douglass was
animated by the urgent need to end slavery. He broke with the Garrisonians when he concluded that dissolution of the Union would only
leave the institution of slavery intact in the southern states. To uphold
the Union, he had to uphold the Constitution. To uphold the Constitution, he had to argue it as an anti-slavery document, which he did
with remarkable skill and tenacity. His example is deeply but not religiously affecting. Douglass' embrace of the Constitution was an exercise in prudential politics and rhetoric rather than religion.
16. L. LARUE, POLITICAL DISCOURSE: A CASE STUDY OF THE WATERGATE AFFAIR 116
(1988). For the entire speech, see id. at 116-20.
17. Id. at 117.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
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Granted "that constitutionalist discourse can be a valuable way of
addressing crucial public issues" (p. 191), why transmute or transubstantiate the usefulness and, perhaps, necessity of constitutional rhetoric into constitutional religion? Briefs, lawbooks and the other media
of constitutional talk are not sacramental tokens. There may be an
analogy here but not a free-wheeling metaphor and certainly not a
fact.
Levinson's undifferentiating use of analogy, metaphor, and fact in
discussion of constitutional faith arises from irresolution about his
commitment to it. He wants it both ways, wants both his religion and
his secular rhetoric at the same time., He is a self-confessed if circumspect member of the - stated as fact - "American faith community"
(p. 193). He knows there must be more, an outside basis for judgment,
but lacks the discourse and distance of genuine transcendence. One
foot is planted in constitutional faith. The other uncertainly tests the
empty air around it for a necessary, unlocated foothold.
What beyond AJfierican faith guides him and can preserve him
from th~ idolatry he warns against? What provides him with a basis
for sensing the ambiguities and limits of constitutional faith and for
evaluating them? What lies outside the American civil religion to inform his reservations about it? The engaging clarity of Levinson's exposition of constitutional faith does not extend to the spare hints at an
apparently essential faith beyond constitutional faith.
Important to his teaching (professing) of law, Levinson says, is the
attempt "to prevent the deification of positive law at the cost of recognition of one's membership in the broader human community" (p.
169). Alternatively, he says that he opposes socializing his students
"in unstinting respect for law" and so insists on making them aware
"that disobedience to the commands of the law may on occasion be
required of someone committed to self-respect and the respect of other
morally admirable people" (p. 170). Is membership "in the broader
human community" or "self-respect" or "respect for other morally admirable people" the more transcendent commitment that allows for
evaluation of the less transcendent constitutional faith? What is its
content? By what criteria are we to identify the others who are, like
the self, morally admirable? Why have regard for the morally admirable only and not also for. sinners? Is the judging self the standard of
judgment? Is there not grave danger here of solipsism or ethnocentrism or nationalism?
Levinson notes how little it surprises that he, "a white, male, wellpaid law professor," would become a born-again constitutional believer, and he understands how others might well have greeted the
bicentennial with rage (p. 193). He therefore concludes that "[t]he
vital challenge facing the American faith community is the possibility
of expanding the relevant 'we' in 'We the People,' who must ultimately
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endorse the faith if it is to live as anything other than an ideological
charade" (p. 193). The point is well taken but not preemptive. Is the
best or most vital or only thing to expand the "we"? To write "I" ever
larger? Is it not one of the problems that we can only think of writing
the "I" larger, expanding an "us" to include a "them"?
If nothing else, the presence of Native Americans is a continuing
reminder that there are on this continent other political realities older
than the constitutional one. There are people here who want no part
in "We the People," who want only that "we" acknowledge the integrity of their life and their tribal way and that we suspend our aggressive belief- oppressive tq them and self-destructive to us - that the
Constitution is the supreme (only, transcendent) law of the land.
Levinson disclaims having written a book of moral philosophy and
seeks to avoid misunderstanding by explaining that his use of the
phrase "moral seriousness" does not imply any form of absolute or
revealed moral grounding and connotes instead "the evaluation of
one's actions or intellectual positions in terms of the welfare of others
•••• " 20 Nevertheless, Constitutional Faith is a book of religion. Levinson is impressively aware of the controversial nature of assertions of
the supremacy of this religion. He cautions against the faithful abandoning "their independent evaluation of the tenets of the faith" (p.
88). But how are they to do so? What is the basis and content of their
independent evaluation? What are "terms of the welfare of others"?
How are they to achieve the terms or the welfare?
Having squarely raised the religious issue with this noteworthy
book and having lent to American civil religion the weight of his
(qualified) willingness to profess it - the more weighty because the
more carefully considered - Levinson should have explained or at
least indicated what keeps this religion in perspective for him and
what might do so for others. If not the biblical stories, then what?
If the legal academy continues to entertain the idea that its subject
is religion as a matter of fact or of metaphor, then, sooner or later, it
must come to terms with Karl Barth's insight, central to his theology,
that religion is a form of unbelief. 21 Levinson says "[w]hether constitutional faith maintains itself depends on our ability to continue taking
it seriously" (p. 194). I think its maintenance depends on our taking it
less seriously, i.e., either from the distance that comes with the stance
20. P. 57 n.•.
21. The point is specifically made at 3 K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS pt. 4, 479 (Mackay,
Parker, Knight, Kennedy & Marks trans. 1961), and is systematically treated in 1 id., pt. 2, at
280-361 (Thomas & Knight trans. 1956). It also lies at the heart of Barth's famous, fateful THE
EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS (E. Hoskyns trans. 1933). The distinction between religion and religious practices, on the one hand, and, on the other, the biblical stories and theology is also drawn
by, among others, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. See D. BONHOEFFER, LETTERS AND p APERS FROM
PRISON 262, 361, 381 (E. Bethge ed. 1971); M. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY 181-85 nn.15-17, 186-88 n.32 (1985).
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of the outsider22 or from the critical, comic distance that comes with
recognition that American civil religion is unbelief. 23

22. See W. STRINGFELLOW, AN ETHIC FOR CHRISTIANS AND OTHER ALIENS IN A
STRANGE LAND (1973); W. STRINGFELLOW, CONSCIENCE AND OBEDIENCE: THE POLITICS OF
ROMANS 13 AND REVELATION 13 IN LIGHT OF THE SECOND COMING (1977).
23. Those seized of genuine belief may find that different contexts require different responses
to the demanded tokens of civil religion. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, the German theologian eventually
arrested and killed by the Nazis,
had been eagerly on the watch for people who could summon up the courage to say No
publicly, and were willing to accept dismissal from their posts in consequence. There now
came a period [after frustration of the first anti-Hitler conspiracy] when it was of the utmost
importance that people of character should remain at the controls in all circumstances and
not allow themselves to be displaced. That meant that what had hitherto been a question of
character now became a mere bagatelle - a greeting with the Hitler salute, for instance.
Instead of refusing this, one had to see that it meant nothing if by it one could get into
key positions. That meant that the use of camouflage became a moral duty.
E. BETHGE, DIETRICH BONHOEFFER 532 (Mosbacher, Ross, Clarke & Glen-Doepel trans. 1970).
For the faithfully nonreligious to employ the indicia of civil religion as camouflage requires both
ethical agility and confidence in forgiveness.

